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ELRAC, INC. V. MASARA: IS THE NEW YORK COURT
OF APPEALS UNDERMINING THE CONCEPT OF
PERMISSIVE USE UNDER THE NEW YORK
VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW?
Natasha Meyers'
INTRODUCTION
In the 1930's, New York enacted Sections 3702 and 388'
of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. The statute's purpose
was to guarantee that insurance coverage would be available to
'J.D. Candidate 2003, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. The
author wishes to thank the Honorable Kenneth A. Davis, Nassau State
Supreme Court and Jeffrey A. Goodstein, Law Secretary, for their
encouragment to write this article. The author would also like to thank
Professor Peter Zablotsky, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center,
for his guidance. The author also wishes to express her gratitude to Dr.
Deborah Hecht, Director of the Writing Center at Touro College Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center, for her patience and continuous support.
2 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 370 (McKinney 1996) The statute states in
pertinent part:
Every person, firm, association or corporation engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers for hire in
any motor vehicle or motorcycle . . . for damages for and
incident to death or injuries to persons . . . or destruction of
property; for each motor vehicle.., such bond or policy of
insurance shall contain a provision for a continuing liability
thereunder .... Any such bond or policy of insurance shall
also contain a provision that such bond or policy of insurance
shall inure to the benefit of any person legally operating the
motor vehicle or motorcycle in the business of the owner and
with his permission, in the same manner and under the same
conditions and to the same extent as to the owner.
3 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 1996) The statute states in
pertinent part:
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall
be liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or
property resulting from negligence in the use or operation of
such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by
any person using or operating the same with the permission,
express or implied, of such owner.
409
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injured parties in as many situations as possible.4 Additionally,
the purpose of the statute was to promote the public policy that an
injured party would be able to seek redress from a defendant,
even if the owner of the vehicle was not the actual person driving
the car at the time of the accident. 5 Two sections -- Section 370
and 388 -- specifically extend the spirit of the statute to cover
rental companies and their rentees by mandating that the rental
company provide coverage to any permissive user of the
automobile.
6
The New York Court of Appeals recently decided
ELRAC, Inc. v. Masara.7 This decision now threatens to
undermine the statutory intention and the policy behind Sections
370 and 388. This decision affects car rental companies as well
as rentees; it also affects the rentees primary insurance company.
In effect, Masara held if a person is not designated as a
"permissive user" on the face of a rental car policy agreement, in
the event of an accident the rental company may seek
indemnification from the rentee for the full amount of damages
caused by the driver's negligence.8 This decision has narrowed
the concept of "permissive use." Thus, rental companies have
been completely freed of their statutory obligation to provide
insurance to an entire category of drivers. This note will
examine case law that has applied the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law Statute Sections 370 and 388 and determine if, in
fact, the legislative intent behind the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law Statutes have been undermined by the recent New
York Court of Appeals interpretation of the term "permissive
use."
4 Id. This section was passed to establish liability where none existed, not to
limit an existing liability. It fixes liability on an absentee owner where his or
her car is being operated by another with his or her consent. Morris v. Snappy
Car Rental Inc., 84 N.Y.2d 21, 28, 614 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (1994).
5 See Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lahey, 95 A.D.2d 150, 153, 465 N.Y.S.2d
553, 556 (2d Dep't 1983).
6 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388.
7 96 N.Y.2d 847, 729 N.Y.S.2d 60 (2001).
' Id. at 849, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
410 [Vol 18
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II. STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK VEHICLE AND
TRAFFIC LAW SECTIONS 370 AND 380
At common law, the owner of a motor vehicle who
permitted another person to use the vehicle was not liable for that
driver's negligence. 9 The only exception to that rule was for a
plaintiff to seek recovery from the owner under a theory of
respondeat superior or agency. 0 The New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law Statute Section 388 was enacted to change the
common law rule. In fact, New York Vehicle and Traffic Law
Statute Section 388 imposes liability on owners of vehicles who
allow another person to operate the vehicle. 1
Regarding the term "permissive user," the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Section 388 has been interpreted
by case law to mean that "permissive use" is the same as
consent. 12 Case law has also defined that an owner of a vehicle
may be liable for death or damages resulting from a driver's
negligent use or operation of a vehicle when used with the
owner's permission, express or implied.'
3
9 See ELRAC, Inc. v. Ward, 96 N.Y.2d 58, 73, 724 N.Y.S.2d 692, 697
(2001).
'0 Id. at 73, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (The statutory presumption is that an
automobile operated under an insured owner and with consent supports the
policy that there should be recourse to financially responsible defendants for
the negligent operation of a vehicle, provided they gave permission to the
driver, express or implied, to operate the vehicle); see also Plath v. Jones, 28
N.Y.2d 16, 319 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1971); Miller v. Sullivan, 174 Misc.2d 690,
694, 666 N.Y.S.2d 892, 895 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1997).
" Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 72-73 ('for the negligence of a person legally
operating the car with the permission, express or implied, of the owner"); see
also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388.
12 See e.g., Darlow v. Drake Bakeries, Inc., 2 A.D.2d 749, 153 N.Y.S.2d
243, 244 (2d Dep't 1956), aff'd, 2 N.Y.2d 983, 163 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1957).
13 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 388(1). See e.g., Lincoln v. Austic, 60
A.D.2d 487, 401 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (3d Dep't 1978) The court examined
evidence that the owner of a motor vehicle gave his son unrestricted use of the
car. The court reasoned that during a short time prior to the actual accident,
the son had given his friend implied permission to drive the vehicle. In fact,
the son told his friend that he could use the car so long as he filled it up with
gas. The court held this satisfied the definition of "permissive use," and thus
2002
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On the other hand, courts have also found where there is
strong evidence that the defendant's automobile was used without
permission, there is no "permissive use." Thus, liability
resulting from an accident will not be imposed on the owner.
14
Ironically, these cases have been presented to the court on
motions for summary judgment. This seems misplaced.
Plaintiffs attorneys want the court to decide these cases based on
the statute rather than a fact specific inquiry into each case.
However, prior case law that has interpreted the language of the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Section 388
distinguish questions of facts from questions of law.15  For
example, in Vincinere v. Ward, 16 the court held that when there is
contradictory testimony as to the "permissive use" of an
automobile, the question of "permissive use" is for the jury.
17
In Leotta v. Plessinger, 18 the court reasoned it is "axiomatic that
proof of ownership of a motor vehicle creates a rebuttable
presumption that the driver was using the vehicle with the
owner's permission, express or implied, until there is evidence to
the contrary." 19 If contested, it is "presented to the jury for final
determination." 
20
the statutory requirement of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Section
388. Id. at 490, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 1022.
14 Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Santos, 175 A.D.2d 91, 573 N.Y.S.2d 695,
(2d Dep't 1991). See e.g., Darlow, 2 A.D.2d at 749, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 244
(where the court held that the defendant's automobile was not being used with
his permission. The driver at the time of the accident was only hired to wash
the vehicle. The court therefore reasoned that the driver was not given
permission to use the automobile as he was on his personal time).
15 Vincinere v. Ward, 259 A.D. 1019, 1020, 20 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (2d Dep't
1940), aff'd, 285 N.Y. 823 (1941)) (where the court upheld the granting of a
motion to set aside a jury verdict, holding that the issue of permissive use was
a material issue of fact and should therefore have been submitted to the trier of




17 Id. at 1019-20, 20 N.Y.S.2d at 452; see also Lincoln, 60 A.D.2d at 491,
401 N.Y.S.2d at 1022.
" 8 N.Y.2d 449, 459, 209 N.Y.S.2d 304, 312 (1961).
19Id. .
20 Id. at 460, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 312-13.
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III. PUBLIC POLICY UNDERLYING THE NEW YORK STATUTES
Older New York case law rests on solid public policy and
crystallizes the legislative intent which prompted the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Statutes Sections 370 and 388. For
example, in Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v.
Continental National American Group,21 the court reasoned that
restrictions excluding coverage for a permitted driver but not
deemed a "permissive user" on the face of the lease agreement
22violated the public policy of the state. The court in Motor
Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. reasoned that car rental
agencies are not in the same position as private car owners.23 In
this case, the rentee gave his friend constructive conseat to
operate the rented vehicle to take his family to a funeral as he
24could not leave work. The court held that restrictions placed on
the rentee were against sound public policy and against the intent
of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Section 388.25
The court reasoned that the rental company "knew or should have
known the probability of the car coming into the hands of another
person was exceedingly great." 26 The New York Court- of
Appeals concluded that any other interpretation of the statute
would violate sound public policy or would "be placing an
unreasonable limitation on the 'permission' contemplated by" the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Section 388.27 The
court reasoned that constructive consent was appropriate and
therefore the statutory requirement was satisfied.28
However, in Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lahey, 29 the
court held that victims of an automobile accident could not
21 35 N.Y.2d 260, 360 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1974).
22 Id. at 264, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 862.
23 Id. at 263, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
24 Id.
25 Id.




29 95 A.D.2d at 150, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
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recover from the rental company or their insurance carrier if the
vehicle was operated without a "permissive user" designated on
the rental agreement. The court reasoned although it is the state's
policy to provide an injured party recourse to a financially
responsible defendant, there are limitations on public policy.
30
Thus, an innocent accident victim may not recover from a car
rental agency if the driver of a rented car was operating the
vehicle without the permission of the car rental company. 3'
However, the court implied if the rented automobile was being
driven with the consent and permission of the rental company, the
rental company would be responsible.32 The court also reasoned
that at the time of the accident, "there was no showing that the
vehicle was being operated by an individual who had the lessee's
permission. " 33 The court ultimately held that "permissive use"
was not established." Interestingly, regardless of its holding, the
court considered the relationship between the rentee and any
"permissive users" that were designated.35
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp v.
Continental National American Group and Utica Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Lahey are not in concert with each other nor is
the latter in concert with prior cases that have interpreted the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Sections 370 and 388.
30 Id. at 153, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 555; see also Vasquez v. Christian Herald
Assn., 186 A.D.2d 467, 468, 588 N.Y.S.2d 291, 292 (1st Dep't 1992).
3' Utica Mutual, 95 A.D.2d at 153, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
32 Id. at 152, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 555. In this case, the rentee rented the
vehicle for a period of one (1) day. He did not return the vehicle for an
additional 21 days. The rental company wrote numerous letter to get the
automobile back, instituted criminal charges, had an arrest warrant issued and
contacted the rentee's family. The court held that under these circumstances
"where the lessee was guilty of unauthorized use of a vehicle for a period of
some 21 days beyond the term of his rental agreement and where the
lessor/owner took all the necessary steps previously set forth, the victims
should not be permitted to recover from the lessor/owner or its insurer". Id at
153, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56.
" Id. at 152, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 555.




Touro Law Review, Vol. 18 [2002], No. 2, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/24
ELRAC V. MASARA
The New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Section
370 also sets forth the responsibility for rental car companies in
New York. In kin with the statutory requirements of Section
388(1), the Vehicle and Traffic Statute Section 370 requires
common carriers, including rental companies, to obtain insurance
or file a surety bond for their vehicles. Specifically, the
requirements of this statute must "inure to the benefit of any
person legally operating the motor vehicle in the business of the
owner and with his permission, in the same manner and under the
same extent as to the owner." 36 This provision is not defined in
later case law. 37 Section 370 requires rental companies to provide
minimum coverage for their rentees. Case law has held that
rental companies are precluded from enforcing rental agreements
to the extent those agreements deny coverage to rentees below the
statutory minimum amount imposed by law. 38 There is also a
requirement that the rentee indemnify the rental company for
liability that falls in excess of the statutory minimum amount.39
This rational is consistent with Section 3420 of the New York
Insurance Law which requires "automobile insurance policies to
cover not only the named insured but also any person operating
or using the vehicle with the permission, express or implied, of
the named insured." 40 New York case law has recognized the
public policy that supports the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law Statute Section 388; in fact, this rational has been
analougously applied to Section 370.41
36 Utica Mutual, 95 A.D.2d at 153, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 555; see also N.Y.
VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 370.
37 See e.g., Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 58, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 692; see also Masara,
96 N.Y.2d at 847, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
38 See Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 78, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
39 See Worldwide Ins. Co. v. United States Capital Ins. Co., 181 Misc. 2d
480, 485-86, 693 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999).
40 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420 (McKinney 2000).
41 Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 78, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
2002 415
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IV. CAR RENTAL AGENCIES AND LIABILTIY INSURANCE
Basic automobile insurance policies have six different
types of coverage that can be purchased.42 Usually, rentees have
their own primary insurance. However, if they do not, they can
purchase insurance from the rental agency for an additional
price.43  Depending on what type of primary automobile
insurance the rentee has, there may be no need to purchase
additional automobile insurance from the rental agency."
Courts in New York have held that "no public policy was
violated by private contract making rental customer's insurance
primary and rentees insurance secondary." 45  For instance, in
Miller v. Sullivan,46 the court held the statutory requirements
were satisfied 7 The court reasoned the rentee was free to either
bargain for a lower rate with the rental company, rely on his or
her own primary insurance coverage or even purchase additional
coverage from the rental company for an added amount.4 8
The cost of insurance at the rental agency depends on
several factors. The most important factor is the age of the rentee
and the state where the car is rented. 49 New York law does not
42 Insurance Information Institute, Do I Need Insurance to Rent a Car,
available at www.iii.org (last visited Jan. 7, 2002). The standard automobile
insurance policy requires the driver to have (1) bodily injury liability; (2)
Medical Payments or Personal Injury Protection (PIP); (3) Property Damage
Liability; (4) Collision; (5) Comprehensive; and (6) Uninsured and
Underinsured Motorist Coverage.
43 Id.
44 Id. (Specifically, if the driver already has collision and comprehensive
coverage, this may be sufficient and no additional insurance may be required.
If a driver does not have collision or comprehensive coverage on his or her
primary automobile insurance policy, in the event the rental car is stolen or
damaged in an accident, the driver or renter may be liable).
45 Miller v. Sullivan, 174 Misc.2d at 697, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1997).
46 Id.
41 Id. at 695, 666 N.Y.S.2d at 896.
48 id.
49 New York State Insurance Department, Collision Damage Waivers &
Rental Vehicle Coverage: Some Questions & Answers, available at
www.ins.state.ny.us/autorent.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2002). This is an
416 [Vol 18
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allow car rental companies to sell Collision Damage Waivers on
rented passenger cars. 5° In fact, New York "prohibits car rental
agencies from, in most circumstances, holding the rentee liable
for more than $100 in the event the automobile is stolen or
damaged." 51
V. How LAWSUITS UNDER THESE SECTIONS ARISE
It is well settled in New York that a rental company's
insurer can "stand in the shoes" of its insured and bring a third
party claim against a tortfeasor, the rentee, for the amount paid to
the insured provided the insured has been made whole. 52 A rental
company is able to seek indemnification from the rentee; sue the
rentee directly or sue the rentee's primary insurance company by
standing in the shoes of its rentee. 3 Subrogation is an equitable
doctrine that entitles an insurer to "stand in the shoes" of its
insured to seek indemnification from third parties whose
"wrongdoing has caused a loss for which the insurer is bound to
re-imburse." 54 The insurer has an equitable right to bring a
subrogation action against a third party whose wrongdoing has
caused a loss to its insured."
In essence, the rental company can assert the rights of the
rentee by bringing forth an action or defending an action on
behalf of another person. Generally, an individual brings an
action or defends an action in their own representative capacity.
important factor that rental agencies take into consideration because they are
giving out a car for personal use without doing a through background check on
the individual in most instances. Some rental car companies may check the
credit of the rentee and examine his or her prior driving history to determine if
they qualify to rent an automobile.
50 Id.
"' Id. (Interestingly, what is not mentioned on the New York State Insurance
Department's website is what is meant by the phrase "in most
circumstances").
52 Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 76, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
" Id. at 75, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
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The exception to the subrogation rule is the anti-
subrogation rule.56 Under this theory, an " insurer has no right of
subrogation against its own insured for a claim arising from the
very risk for which the insured was covered . . . . "5 The
purpose of this rule is to prevent an insurer from applying the
doctrine of subrogation to avoid its duty to pay under its
insurance policy. 58 A recent decision from the New York Court
of Appeals reasoned " 'for the purposes of the anti-subrogation
rule, there is simply no reason for treating a "permissive user" '
who qualifies as an insured under the policy 'differently than a
named insured.' "59 The court also stated that contrary to the
arguments raised by the plaintiff, self-insurers are "not immune
from anti-subrogation principles." 60
VI. NEW YoRK's COURT OF APPEALS LANDMARK DECISION:
ELRAC, INC. V. WARD
The undermining of the term "permissive use" began
when the court departed from applying the principles of Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Santos.61 The Aetna court held that an
automobile insurer must present sufficient evidence to rebut a
strong presumption of "permissive use" under Section 388 of the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law where the driver of the
vehicle at the time of the accident was not the actual rentee.62 In
Aetna, the driver testified that the owner of the automobile did
not permit him to use the vehicle unless an emergency existed.
The court reasoned that Section 388 of the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law did not classify the driver in this situation as being a
56 id.
7 Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 75-76, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 699 (citing Pennsylvania
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Austin Powder Co., 68 N.Y.2d 465, 470, 510 N.Y.S.2d 982,
985 (1986)).
5s Id. at 76, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 699.
'9 Id. at 77, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 700 (citing Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Travelers
Indemnity Co., 92 N.Y.2d 363, 374-75, 681 N.Y.S.2d 208, 214 (1998)).60 id. at 73, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
61 Aetna, 175 A.D.2d at 91, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
62 Id.
10
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"permissive user." 63 This is a very tight and narrow reading of
the statute. However, it illustrates that courts have examined the
relationship between the rentee and the driver of the vehicle.
This case also illustrates that the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law Section 388 presumes "permissive use" exists unless there is
evidence to the contrary presented to the court.
64
Additionally, the holding of Morris v. Snappy Car Rental,
Inc.,65 re-affirmed the purpose and public policy behind Section
388 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law. The Morris court
reasoned that the purpose of Section 388 was to:
remove the hardship which the common-law rule
visited upon innocent persons by preventing 'an
owner from escaping liability by saying that his car
was being used without authority or not in his
business' . . . [the] linkage of an owner's vicarious
liability to an owner's obligation to maintain
adequate insurance coverage suggests that the
Legislature's goal was to ensure that owners of
vehicles that are subject to regulation in New York
'act responsibly' with regard to those vehicles.66
The main case that paved the way for ELRAC, Inc. v.
Ward and its progeny was Allstate Insurance Company v. Snappy
Car Rental.67 In Allstate Insurance Company, the federal district
court applying New York law held that contractual provisions
obligating rentees to indemnify rental companies for liability were
invalid if the indemnification sought to undermine or eviscerate
the minimum amount of automobile liability insurance coverage
required of every owner of a motor vehicle in the State of New
York.68 In essence, the court reasoned that primary liability
could not be shifted from rental companies to customers, nor
63 id.
6 Id.
65 84 N.Y.2d 21, 614 N.Y.S.2d 362 (1994).
6 Id. at 27, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (citations omitted).
67 16 F. Supp. 2d 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
68 Id. at 411.
2002 419
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could primary liability coverage be shifted to customers' primary
insurers entirely. 69
In April 2001, the New York Court of Appeals addressed
the issue of indemnification agreements between rentees and
rental car companies. 70  The court clarified the amount of
indemnification rental companies can seek from their rentee's.
Specifically, the New York Court of Appeals decided that rental
companies are permitted to seek indemnification from their
rentees only for amounts in excess of the statutory minimum
amount of insurance coverage. 71 The statutory minimum amounts
imposed in New York are $25,000 for bodily injury, $50,000 for
death, and up to $10,000 for property damages. 72 In Ward,73 the
New York Court of Appeals held that Section 370 of the New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law required rental companies to
provide a minimum amount of insurance for its vehicles.74
Additionally, the court held that the rental company, in this case
ELRAC, may only enforce an indemnification agreement in
excess of the statutory minimum amount of insurance coverage
required by the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute
Section 370. 75 In this case, ELRAC was prohibited from seeking
indemnification from its renters for amounts less than the
minimum liability requirement.76 However, the court, on its own
initiative, held that the insurance policy must "inure to the
benefit" of the "permissive user" .7 The court reasoned that a
rentee is a "permissive user" and therefore Section 370 of the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law is applicable.78 Thus, the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 370 required the
69 Id.
70 Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 58, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
71 d. at 73, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
72 Id. at 73, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 697. In Masara, the Court specifically held that
the amount of coverage for property damages is up to $10,000. 96 N.Y.2d at
847, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 62. See also, infra note 98.
71 Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 58, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
74 Id. at 78, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
75 Id.
76 id.
77 Id. at 72, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
7 Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 72, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
12
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rental company to provide the minimum amount of insurance
coverage to the rentee.7 9 In writing this decision, the court stated
the language of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Section
370 was "plain and precise." 
8 0
The Ward court relied on the anti-subrogation theory.
Under the theory of anti-subrogation, an " 'insurer has no right
of subrogation against its own insured to a claim arising from the
very risk for which the insured was covered . . . even where the
insured has expressly agreed to indemnify the party . .. ,I 8,I
The Ward decision was extremely imperative and timely. This
case acknowledged that rental companies are allowed to seek
indemnification from their rentees as long as the amount is above
the statutory minimum required by the Section 370 of the New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law. 2 The court reasoned, that
"indeed, to further 'abrogate the right of indemnification' would
disparage 'the, important countervailing right of freedom of
contract.' 8 3  The New York Court of Appeals held that the
standard indemnification clause presented to the rentee by the
rental company violated public policy and the anti-subrogation
rule. Thus, ELRAC could only seek indemnification from its
lessees for amounts above the required minimum coverage.8 4
This rule was not clearly set forth before this case was decided.
Thus, this landmark case changed the policy and holdings for
many cases that followed.8 5  In essence, this case clearly
explained the rights and obligations of rental companies as well as




81 Id. at 74, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (citing Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 68
N.Y.2d at 470, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 985).
82 Id. at 78, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
83 Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 78, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (citing Morris, 84 N.Y.2d
at 28-29, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 364).84id.
85 See, e.g., Masarra, 96 N.Y.2d at 847, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 61; Haight, 286
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The holding in Ward relied on the reasoning of prior case
law. Specifically, in Morris v. Snappy Car Rentals,86 the court
reasoned that under New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law
Statute Sections 370 and 388, a rental company is required to
maintain minimum liability coverage for bodily injury, death and
87property damages. The New York Court of Appeals in Morris
stated there was "nothing in the statute's scheme, language, or
legislative history suggests that a lessor/owner cannot by contract
secure indemnification from a lessee/driver for liability stemming
from the latter's negligence which exceeds the amounts for which
owners are required to be insured." 88
A string of cases emanated from the recent Ward
decision.89 The Appellate Division, Second Department followed
the reasoning of Ward when it held an indemnification agreement
valid and enforceable as long as it "exceeded the minimum
amount of insurance it was required to maintain .... "90 The
court re-enforced the holding of Ward when it stated that to the
extent the indemnification provision contained in the rental
agreement sought total indemnification from the rentee, it is
invalid under New York Law. 91
VII. TAKING ELRAC, INC. v. WARD A STEP Too FAR:
ELRAC, INC., V. MASSARA AND ITS PROGENY
A few months after Ward was decided, the New York
Court of Appeals expanded the Ward holding in Masara.92 The
court, on its own motion, rendered a rather solid, but
86 Morris, 84 N.Y.2d at 21, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
87 Id. at 28, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
88 Id.
89 Haight v. Estate of DePamphilis, 286 A.D.2d 369, 371, 728 N.Y.S.2d
790, 792 (2d Dep't 2001); AIU Ins. Co. v. ELRAC, Inc., 287 A.D.2d 668,
669, 732 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (2d Dep't 2001); Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 847, 729
N.Y.S.2d at 60.
90 Haight, 286 A.D.2d at 371, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
9' Id. at 371, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 792 (citing Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 78, 724
N.Y.S.2d at 701).
92 Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 847, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
422 [Vol 18
14
Touro Law Review, Vol. 18 [2002], No. 2, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/24
ELRAC V. MA SARA4
questionable decision. The court held that rental companies must
provide minimum insurance to rentees under the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 370 if it "inures to the benefit"
of any "permissive user" of the rented automobile.93 In Masara,
the court rejected the defendant's argument that ELRAC could
not seek indemnification from the defendant. In effect, Masara
held if a person is not designated as a "permissive user" on the
face of a rental car policy agreement, in the event of an accident
the rental company may seek indemnification from the rentee for
the full amount of damages caused by the driver's negligence. 94
The court reasoned because the driver of the vehicle was not a
"permissive user" of the rented automobile, the statutory
minimum did not "inure to his benefit." In this case, the court
looked to the face of the rental agreement; it prohibited the rentee
from allowing someone not on the rental agreement to operate the
car. The rentee's father was operating the car and was involved
in the accident. As a result, the rental company sought total
indemnification from the rentee, including the statutory minimum
amount it would have otherwise been required to provide under
New York law. 95 That is all the court said. The court did not
define the term "permissive use" or distinguish prior case law
that defined "permissive use" as being express or implied. The
Masara decision comes from the New York Court of Appeals and
sets the precedent for the lower courts to adhere to.
The court in Masara also defined the extent that rental
companies are responsible for property damages. Specifically,
the court stated that Section 370 of the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law requires rental companies to obtain a maximum
amount of coverage of $10,000 for property damages.96 The
legislature explicitly specified "minimum" coverage amounts for
other types of injuries, but not for property damages.97 Since
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Section 370 specifies
9' Id. at 857, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 62; see also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 370.
94 Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 856, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
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no minimum insurance requirement for property damages, a
rental company may seek indemnification from its rentees for
property damage awards to the extent otherwise legally
permissible with a capped maximum of $10,000.98
New York courts have followed the reasoning in Masara
without skipping a beat. Specifically, a recent decision on point
illustrates that the New York Appellate Division, Second
Department upheld Masara's interpretation of "permissive
use." 99 In AIU Insurance Company v. ELRAC, INC.,100 the New
York Appellate Division held, in a one page opinion, that the
insurance company was not obligated to defend or indemnify the
98 Id. The New York State Legislature proposed amendments to Section 1.
Subdivision 1 and 3 of Section 388 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law to read as
follows:
A lessor of a vehicle, under an agreement to rent or lease
such vehicle for a period of less than one year, shall be
deemed the owner of the vehicle for the purpose of
determining liability for the use or operation of the vehicle,
but for not more than one hundred thousand dollars per
person nor not more than three hundred thousand dollars per
incident for bodily injury, and not more than fifty thousand
dollars for property damage. If the lessee, renter or operator
of the vehicle is uninsured or has any insurance with limits
less than five hundred thousand dollars combined property
damage and bodily injury liability, the lessor shall be liable
for up to an additional five hundred thousand dollars in
economic damages only arising out of the use or operation of
the vehicle. The additional specified liability of the lessor or
rental company for economic damages shall be reduced by
amounts actually recovered from the lessee, from the
operator, and from any insurance or self insurance covering
the lessee, renter or operator. The limits on liability in this
paragraph shall not ally to an owner of vehicles that are used
for commercial activity in the owner's ordinary course of-
business, other than a rental company that rents or leases
vehicles ....
For further information, see A.B. 6089, 224th Ass. Reg. Session.
(N.Y. 2001). As of the date of this publication, this bill not been
enacted.
99 AIU Ins. Co. v. ELRAC, Inc., 287 A.D.2d 668, 669, 732 N.Y.S.2d 105,
106 (2d.Dep't 2001).
'°Id. at 668, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
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defendants.' ° ' Relying on the reasoning of Masara, the court
held that the rental company was entitled to full indemnification
because, at the time of the accident, an unauthorized driver was
operating the car. 0 2 Based on the prior holdings of Ward and
Masara, the rentee's violation of the rental agreement created the
loophole for the rental company to wash their hands clean of all
liability and responsibility. 10 3  However, if the court attempted
to distinguigh Masara rather than just go along with the decision
as if it had no other choice in the matter, the outcome may have
been different.
The New York Appellate Division, Second Department,
recently decided another decision that is in concert with Ward. 104
The Haight court held that "to the extent that the indemnification
provision contained in ELRAC's rental agreement seeks total
indemnification from the renter, it is invalid under New York
law." 05 However, the facts of Haight were distinguishable from
A UI Insurance Co., as the renter of the vehicle was the actual
driver that rented the vehicle. Thus, there was no opportunity to
distinguish Masara and attempt to elaborate on the meaning of
"permissive use." The court re-affirmed the principle holding of
Ward.
VIII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION IN MASARA
The most important implication stemming from Masara is
that it affects rental companies and their rentees. The court has
narrowly defined the term "permissive use." In essence, rental
companies have a loophole. Specifically, if the rentee does not
designate a "permissive user" to the rental company, the rental
company may avoid complete liability. Rental companies, based
on recent New York case law, have to provide minimum
'o' Id. at 668, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
102 id.
103 id.
'04 Haight, 286 A.D.2d at 369, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
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insurance coverage, however, this insurance coverage will now
turn on the definition and application of the word "permissive
user." 106
If the New York courts continue on their current trend,
rental companies will get off the hook rather easily. In fact, they
will not be held liable to their rentee's or third parties that are
injured if their rentees do not designate additional drivers that are
specifically authorized to operate the vehicle. 0 7 For instance, if
a driver is involved in an accident and is not deemed a
"permissive user" on the face of the rental car company
agreement, then the rental company is not liable for the negligent
acts of that driver at all. 108  The bottom line is that in these
instances, rental companies can seek indemnification for the full
amount of the damages from their rentees. This includes
damages that the statutory minimum amount of insurance
coverage requires rental companies to provide. This is where the
disparity lies.
The rentee has the option to fill out the rental agreement
accurately and include any "permissive users" on the form
directly. However, if the rentee fails or forgets to list a
"permissive user," but "permissive use" could have been
implied from the circumstances, the Court of Appeals has chosen
not to address this reality. Thus, the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that rental companies have no responsibility to their
rentees in these circumstance.- The Court of Appeals ignored the
public policy motivation as well as the statutory minimum
insurance requirement that the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law Statutes Sections 370 and 388 mandate.1 9 However, the
Court of Appeals in New York and the Second Department, have
consistently applied this contradictory rational in their
holdings." 0
"o Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 77, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
107 See, e.g., Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 847, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
'08 Id. at 857, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 849, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 61; AIUIns. Co.,
287 A.D.2d at 669, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 106.
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The legislative intent behind the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law Statutes Sections 370 and 388 as explained in earlier
case law, unlike the recent case law, emphasizes the public policy
aim. The aim is to protect the public and to make an owner liable
for an injury caused by the negligent operation of his car. "
However, New York case law has become dispositive on the term
"permissive user." In fact, the court does not look to see if the
driver of the rental vehicle had the implied or express permission
of the rentee.11 2  Older case law that has decided this issue
considered the plain meaning of the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law Statute Section 388 and reasoned "permissive use"
should be determined from the surrounding circumstances at the
time that the car was negligently operated.' 
13
The question under scrutiny here is how the courts have
interpreted the term "permissive use" and to what extent is the
term in conflict with the legislative intent behind the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Statutes Sections 370 and 388. The
plain meaning of the term "permissive use" seems to apply to the
relationship between the rentee and any driver he or she gives
express or implied consent to. Obviously, the rentee is a
"permissive user" as he or she rents the vehicle directly from the
rental company.
However, what about the driver involved in an accident
who is not the rentee? Should the term "permissive use" be
interpreted to encompass the relationship between the driver and
any additional users he or she designates, an agency theory, or
should the relationship be limited to that of the rental company
and the actual rentee. This is a determinative factor that needs to
be clarified either by the New York Court of Appeals or the New
"' See, e.g., Dittman v. Davis, 299 N.Y. 601 (1949).
112 See, e.g., Masara, 96. N.Y.2d at 849, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 61. But see,
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 35 N.Y.2d at 260, 362
N.Y.S.2d at 859; Worldwide Ins. Co., 181 Misc.2d at 480, 693 N.Y.S.2d at
901; Bindert v. Elmhurst Taxi Corp., 168 Misc. 892, 6 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Mun.
Ct. Queens County 1938).
13 Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 35 N.Y.2d at 260, 362
N.Y.S.2d at 859; see also Worldwide Ins. Co., 181 Misc.2d at 480, 693
N.Y.S.2d at 901; see also Bindert, 168 Misc. at 892, 6 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
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York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statutes Sections 370 and 388 need
to be amended to reflect the New York Court of Appeals new
interpretation of a "permissive user."
Indeed, there are cases which have interpreted the New
York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statutes Sections 370 and 380 and
concluded that "permissive use" can be expressly or implicitly
designated by the rentee.1 4 Even the legislature acknowledged
that "permissive use" may be given to any driver the rentee
designates. 115 In fact, these cases were never expressly overruled
by the court. Thus, it is my understanding that the main issue of
disparity here is that New York case law does not look beyond
the rental agreement between the rentee and the rental company
to determine who had "permissive use" to operate the
automobile. 11
6
As simple as it may seem, there are grave repercussions
that are associated with the determination as to who is a
"permissive user." One of the problems that may stem from
these recent cases in New York is that the burden of liability is
completely shifted from the rental car company, even if it was
only bound to pay the statutory minimum amount of insurance in
the first place, to the primary insurance company. The primary
insurance company therefore has to pay the bill when a driver of
a rental vehicle let another person operate the vehicle without
first checking the box or circling the form correctly on the rental
114 See cases cited supra note 113.
" N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388. Under Section 388, the owner of a
motor vehicle is presently held liable for injuries to another resulting from the
negligent operation of their automobile when the owner gave permission to the
driver to operate the vehicle regardless of the purpose for which the car was
used.
"6Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 857, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 62. The court reasoned that
the driver was not a "permissive user" and the statutory minimum did not
apply to the rental agency. However, the court did not consider if the rentee
gave the driver implied or express permission to drive the vehicle. If the
rentee gave the driver his implied or express permission to drive the vehicle,
then the statutory minimum should apply. However, the court did not look
beyond the four comers of the rental agreement and held that as the rentee did
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car company agreement designating a "permissive user." Thus,
the primary insurance company will have to cover the liability in
full because it is the rentee's primary insurance carrier.
But why should the rental company avoid all liability and
shift the burden directly to the primary insurer? Case law
interpreting the New York Vehicle and Traffic Statute Section
388 reasoned that the public policy behind the Statute is to
provide an avenue of relief to an injured party. 1 7 This is a good
public policy argument and is well supported by case law."'
However, nothing in the statute, or prior case law, suggests that
the primary insurance company should be fully responsible in
such an incidence. 119  The court in Ward held that rental
companies can seek indemnification from their rentees for
amounts in excess of the statutory minimum amount required by
law. 120 The court in Ward also held that a rentee is a "permissive
user" of the vehicle. 12 1 However, the court did not define what a
"permissive user" was, rather it referenced the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Statutes. Moving in a narrower
direction, the court in Masara applied the term "permissive user"
to encompass the relationship between the rentee and the car
rental company and looked solely to the rental agreement.
Reasoning there were no authorized drivers listed on the rental
agreement, the court held there were no "permissive users."
122
The approach the New York court has undertaken is narrow
minded and misconstrued. Specifically, the New York Court of
Appeals in Masara centers on the relationship between the renter
and the rental car company thereby eviscerating the legislative
intent underlying the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.
117 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388. This section is designed in the interest
of public safety in the exercise of police power of the state, and is applicable to
a carrier engaged in interstate commerce. See Dittman, 299 N.Y. at 601.
1'8 See cases cited supra note 113.
"9 See Schuler v. Whitmore Rauber & Vicinus, 233 A.D. 892, 892, 25
N.Y.S. 886, 886 (4th Dep't 1931); Hatch v. Lovejoy, 142 Misc. 137, 137,
254 N.Y.S. 35, 37 (Sup. Ct. Schuyler County 1931).
120 Ward, 96 N.Y.2d at 73, 724 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
121 id.
122 Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 849, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
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It is my position that the term "permissive user" in the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Section 370 and 388
was construed by the Masara court contrary to the definition that
earlier case law had established. 123  The term "permissive user"
is meant to include those drivers that have the express or implied
consent of the owner or lessor or rentee of the vehicle. 124 Since
Masara was decided in 2001, courts have narrowed their
interpretation of the term "permissive user." 12 5 In doing so, the
New York Court of Appeals has interpreted "permissive user" to
apply to the relationship between the rental company and the
rentee, rather than looking to the relationship between the rentee
and the actual driver of the automobile. 126 Clearly, the rentee is a
"permissive user" but what about a person that he or she
designates to drive the car? This question will turn on the issue
of whether the rentee disclosed this information to the rental car
agency. If not, then there was no "permissive use." Flashing in
the face of both public policy as well as the New York Vehicle
and Traffic Law Statute Sections 370 and 388 that was enacted to
change the strict common law rules, recent New York Court of
Appeals cases are following this arcane rational.
For instance, AIU Insurance Co., clearly followed in the
wake of Masara without a ripple. In fact, the Second Department
basically said this is what the Court of Appeals has held and
therefore we must adhere to it. 127 In light of the shifting of
responsibility from the secondary insurance company to the
primary insurance company, my opinion is that primary insurance
123 See cases cited supra note 113.
124 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (The statutory presumption is that a
vehicle being operated under an insured owner with the owner's consent at the
time of the accident supports the policy that there should be recourse to
financially responsible insured defendants for injuries); see Morris, 84 N.Y.2d
at 27, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
125 Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 849, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
126 Id. (It is uncontroverted that the rentee is a "permissive user" of the car
as it is he or she that elects to rent from the rental company).
12' AIU Ins. Co., 287 A.D.2d at 668, 732 N.Y.S.2d at 106; see also
Hannibal v. Ford Credit Titling & Trust, 289 A.D.2d 446, 447, 735 N.Y.S.2d
567, 568 (2d Dep't 2001).
430 [Vol 18
22
Touro Law Review, Vol. 18 [2002], No. 2, Art. 24
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/24
ELRAC V. MASARA
companies will attempt to appeal these verdicts. They will argue
they should not have to be 100% liable for these accidents.
Conversely, the older New York Court of Appeals
decision in Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., looked
to the relationship between the rentee and the driver of the
vehicle. 128  The court reasoned the rentee gave constructive
consent to the driver of the rented vehicle. As such, the statutory
requirement was satisfied as "permission can be given expressly
or impliedly." 129 This decision clearly illustrates the term
"permissive user" is not limited to the narrow reading it has been
given by the recent New York Court of Appeals decision in
Masara. Rather than looking to older case law when the New
York Court of Appeals once looked at the relationship between
the rentee and the driver to determine if in fact "permissive use"
was given, the court did not chose this approach. In fact, recent
decisions have departed from this mode of analysis completely
without legal justification.
Furthermore, deciding questions of "permissive use" on
summary judgment motions has grave implications and legal
consequences aside from liability damage determinations.
Interestingly, prior cases that have interpreted the New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute Section 388 concluded that if
there is a question of "permissive use" or consent, the question
should be given to the trier of fact. 130 Surprisingly, recent cases
are coming to the New York courts on summary judgment
motions. This also seems contradictory to the cases that have
interpreted the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law and concluded
that questions of ambiguity as to interpretation of "permissive
use" go to the jury and should not be decided as a matter of
law. 131 If courts continue to look at the plain meaning of the
128 35 N.Y.2d at 264, 360 N.Y.S.2d at 861.
129 Id.
130 See e.g, Vincinere, 259 A.D. at 1019, 20 N.Y.S.2d at 452; Lincoln, 60
A.D.2d at 491, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 1022; Leotta, 8 N.Y.2d at 459, 209
N.Y.S.2d at 312; Wynn v. Middleton, 184 A.D.2d 1019, 1020, 584 N.Y.S.2d
684, 685 (4th Dep't 1992).
131 Wynn, 184 A.D.2d at 1020, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 685 (the court held that a
rental company was not entitled to summary judgment dismissing wrongful
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rental agency agreement and not at the intention of the rentee and
at least explore the possibility that "permissive use" was given to
the driver involved in the accident, then many cases will
automatically be disposed of. This approach undermines and cuts
right to the heart the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statute
Sections 370 and 388.
IX. CONCLUSION
In light of the recent decisions that have come down from
the New York Court of Appeals last year, it is clear that the New
York courts will continue to hold that rentees who allow another
person to drive their rental car but who do not designate them as
a "permissive user" on the rental agreement, will be fully liable
for any damages in the event an "unauthorized user" gets into an
accident.
However, now that the burden has passed to the rentee's
primary insurance company for full liability, a serious issue may
arise. Specifically, will the primary insurer just acquiesce and
offer to be responsible for the floodgate of litigation that is about
to pile up? If rental car companies can evade liability as a result
of a rentee not having designated a "permissive user," why
should the primary insurance company pick up the tab without at
least a challenge. Since these decisions just came down during
the past year, it is likely there will be challenges to this line of
case interpretation. No one wants to be 100% liable for the
negligent acts or wrongdoing of another, especially insurance
companies. The solution is not clear as the law is not clear itself
as to the meaning of "permissive use" and its various case law
interpretations.
death action brought on behalf of a passenger killed in a rental car driven by a
friend of the rentee. The court did not take into account that the car was being
driven beyond the term of the lease or that the car was driven by a driver who
was not listed on the rental agreement as a "permissive user." The court
reasoned that the rental company failed to overcome the presumption that the
vehicle -was being used with the owner's consent); see also Vincinere, 259
A.D. 1019, 1020, 20 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452.
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The New York Court of Appeals has relied on some of the
prior cases interpreting the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law
Statutes Sections 370 and 388 respectively. However, there is
still ambiguity that needs to be addressed. The intent and public
policy supporting the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law Statutes
Sections 370 and 388 has been overlooked by the high court in
New York. The other possibility is that the high court erred
when it reasoned that rental companies are free from liability as
far as the statutory minimums mandated by the statute are
concerned if a rentee does not designate a "permissive user" on
the face of a standard rental agreement without overruling prior
case law. 132 It is possible that the New York Court of Appeals
did not take into consideration these factors and their
repercussions. Someone should ultimately be responsible and an
injured person should have a legal redress. Nonetheless, as a
result of these decisions, I speculate a floodgate of litigation will
present itself and the New York Court of Appeals may have to
address this issue in the near future.
132 Masara, 96 N.Y.2d at 849, 729 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
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